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1.1  Introduction 
For the past three decades the rapid growth of pension plans has 
been one of the most significant institutional influences in United States 
labor and financial markets. Furthermore, the past growth trend seems 
likely to continue into the future indefinitely. In order to study the 
economic effects of this development, the NBER embarked on a major 
research project which began in 1980. 
This book represents the third in a series of four conference volumes 
reporting the findings of that study. The first volume, FinanciaZAspects 
of  the  United States Pension System (1983), included analysis of the 
financial soundness of the private pension system, the rights and ob- 
ligations of plan sponsors and beneficiaries, the impact of inflation and 
cost-of-living adjustments of pension benefits, and the financial status 
of the elderly. The second volume, Pensions, Labor, and Individual 
Choice (1985),  dealt with the incentive effects of pension plans  and 
the labor  market  and  distributional  impacts of  social  security.  The 
present  volume  covers a  broader  range  of  pension  issues  than  the 
previous two, and makes use of new and richer data sources that have 
subsequently become available. The papers were originally presented 
at a conference held in San Diego, California, on April  13-14,  1984. 
We  have included the discussants’ comments for each paper. 
In this introduction we intend to give the reader an overview of the 
issues discussed and the findings reported in the papers. We  have grouped 
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the papers  into four parts:  (1)  Pensions  and Corporate Finance; (2) 
Pensions and Retirement Income Adequacy; (3) Pensions and Savings 
Behavior; and (4) Pensions and the Labor Market. 
1.2  Pensions and Corporate Finance 
There is a presumption  on the part of the public and their elected 
representatives that pension plans sponsored by private corporations 
should be managed exclusively in the best interests of the beneficiaries 
of those plans. This presumption has always been the cornerstone of 
public policy toward pensions in the United States and was codified 
by Congress in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA). It is also the rationale for the tax-exempt status conferred 
on pension funds by  Congress and for the provision of pension insur- 
ance through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
There is a justifiable concern that the use of pension fund assets for 
corporate purposes might violate the primary purpose of insuring re- 
tirement  income  adequacy for employees.  Recently,  such topics as 
corporations’ right to terminate overfunded plans and retrieve surplus 
assets, the contribution of corporate securities and leaseholds to pen- 
sion funds in lieu of cash, and the burden of unfunded liabilities on the 
PBGC have, therefore, become matters of  intense debate and public 
scrutiny. 
There is, of course, no necessary conflict between the interests of a 
corporation’s shareholders and the interests of  its employees in  the 
pension plans  sponsored by the corporation. Indeed, in  the case of 
defined contribution pension plans  (i.e., those in  which the sponsor 
discharges his obligation by making contributions to the fund in the 
employee’s name) the employer simply acts as a steward for the pension 
assets, which are held in trust for the employees. Such plans are not 
covered by PBGC insurance, but for defined benefit plans (i.e., those 
in which the employer is obliged to pay a retirement benefit determined 
according to a formula based on the employee’s years of service and 
earnings history) the situation is more complex. In a defined benefit 
plan the employee has a claim on the employer equal in  value to the 
present  value of  his or her vested accrued benefits under the plan’s 
benefit formula. The plan’s assets, in effect, serve as collateral for this 
claim. 
In a number of  papers,  some of  which were included  in  the first 
NBER pension volume in this project (Bodie and Shoven 1983), NBER 
researchers have explored the theoretical consequences of  corporate 
pension policy under the assumption that management acts exclusively 
in the best interests of shareholders with regard to funding its pension 
plan and managing the pension assets. From this perspective, defined 3  Introduction 
benefit liabilities are just one more set of  fixed financial liabilities of 
the firm. Pension assets, while collateral for these liabilities, are really 
just assets of the firm in that the surplus/deficit belongs to the firm’s 
shareholders. 
This view explicitly ignores the interests of the beneficiaries, in part 
because their defined benefits are insured by the PBGC anyway. From 
the corporate financial perspective, then, the beneficiaries are protected 
by the government, and the corporate pension decisions become what 
amounts to a game between the corporation and various government 
agencies and interests, a game that can be thought of  as an integral 
part of corporate financial policy. 
The tax effects are the first, and for most companies the most im- 
portant, part of this game. Because firms can effectively earn a pretax 
rate of  return on any assets held in the pension fund and pass these 
returns through to shareholders much as if the pension fund were an 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or Keogh plan, the comparative 
advantage of a pension fund lies in its ability to be invested in the most 
heavily taxed assets. 
Presumably this means that pension funds should be invested entirely 
in taxable bonds, as opposed to common stock, real estate, or other 
assets that are in  effect  taxed  at lower marginal tax rates for most 
shareholders.  Furthermore, the corporation  should fund its pension 
plan to the maximum extent allowed by the Internal Revenue Service 
so as to maximize the value of this tax shelter to shareholders. The 
tax effects of pensions should therefore induce corporations to follow 
extreme policies-fully  funded (indeed overfunded) pension plans with 
the pension assets invested entirely in taxable bonds. 
A  second effect  results from government insurance  of  the firm’s 
pension liabilities. Briefly, the PBGC’s insurance of  pension benefits 
gives the firm a put option-it  can shed its pension liabilities by giving 
the PBGC the assets in the pension plan plus 30% of the market value 
of  its net worth. As with any option, the value of this put increases 
with the risk of the underlying asset. Thus, as long as the PBGC neither 
regulates pension fund risk nor accelerates its own claim at the first 
sign of  financial distress, the firm has an incentive to undermine the 
PBGC’s claim. It can do so and maximize the value of  its put option 
by funding its pension plan only to the minimum permissible extent 
and  investing  the pension  assets  in  the  riskiest possible  securities. 
These policies are, of course, exactly opposite those suggested by the 
tax effects described above. 
Combining these two effects, the tax effect and the PBGC put, the 
firm can be viewed as facing a trade-off. By overfunding and investing 
in bonds it maximizes tax benefits, but by underfunding and investing 
in risky assets it maximizes the value of  the pension put. This trade- 4  Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise 
off does not produce a set of unique interior optimal policies, but rather 
implies that each firm should be following one of two very different 
extreme policies. If the firm is profitable and relatively safe, the pension 
put will probably  have negligible value. Hence the firm should fully 
fund its pension  plan and invest entirely in the  most  heavily taxed 
securities. On the other hand, if the firm is both unprofitable and risky, 
the tax shelter may be superfluous, and the pension put may be quite 
valuable. In order to maximize its value, the firm should underfund its 
plan to the greatest extent possible and invest entirely in  the riskiest 
securities. 
A  third effect has emphasized the pension  fund’s usefulness as a 
source of  corporate liquidity or as a store of temporarily excess cor- 
porate funds. The view that firms will maintain some financial slack 
has a long informal history based on the notion that they do not wish 
to be caught having to rely on external financing at “unfavorable” 
times. 
Such slack could be kept in the form of either liquid assets and unused 
debt capacity or pension assets. The latter is advantageous from a tax 
standpoint, but liquid assets and unused debt capacity are presumably 
substantially more accessible, particularly in the short run. While firms 
have increasingly attempted to tap their excess pension assets in recent 
years, the legality and regulatory status of these attempts has yet to 
be  clearly  defined.  One might, therefore, expect  firms to trade tax 
benefits against accessibility in deciding how much of  their financial 
slack to keep in the pension fund. The stronger are a firm’s earnings 
and the greater its need for tax shelter, the greater will be its tendency 
to build financial slack in the form of  additional pension assets, and 
vice versa. 
Together, these different aspects of corporate pensions (the tax shel- 
ter,  the PBGC  put, and the  accessibility  of  financial slack) form  a 
corporate financial perspective on pension policy, which can be con- 
trasted with the more traditional perspective which views the pension 
plan as entirely separate from the corporation’s other assets and lia- 
bilities and managed strictly in the interests of the covered employees. 
Is the corporate financial perspective supported or confirmed by the 
data we have on corporate pension funding and asset allocation? 
Previous attempts to test the theory empirically have been hampered 
by lack of appropriate data. In particular, information was lacking on 
the discount rate used by firms in computing the present value of their 
pension liabilities. Reported pension liabilities are very sensitive to this 
discount rate. The higher the rate, the lower the reported liability. Thus, 
different firms having the same funding status in reality might appear 
to have very different pension liabilities simply because they choose 
different discount rates. 5  Introduction 
The empirical research reported in the paper, “Funding and Asset 
Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans: An Empirical Investigation,” 
by  Zvi Bodie, Jay 0. Light, Randall Mdrck, and Robert A. Taggart, 
Jr., which uses a new data set containing this variable, indicates that 
the discount rate chosen by a firm is systematically related  to its fi- 
nancial condition and therefore, unless all firms’ liabilities are adjusted 
to a uniform rate, the true cross-sectional relationship between financial 
condition and funding status is obscured. In particular it shows that 
less profitable firms tend to choose higher discount rates and thus to 
report lower pension liabilities. 
The empirical results on funding and asset allocation lend some sup- 
port to the corporate financial perspective. First, there is a significant 
positive relationship between firm profitability and the degree of pen- 
sion funding.  Second, there is also some evidence that firms facing 
higher risk and lower tax liabilities are less inclined to fund their pension 
plans fully. Third, a significant fraction of firms invest their pension 
assets entirely in fixed income securities, and the proportion of assets 
allocated to fixed income securities is positively related to the level of 
funding. The results also indicate that  the traditional and corporate 
financial perspectives on pension decisions are far from mutually ex- 
clusive. Across firms, the asset allocation  findings suggest that the 
corporate financial perspective may be more appropriate in describing 
small pension plans, while larger plans appear to take on some of the 
characteristics of the traditional perspective.  Moreover, even within 
the same firm, different plans may be more appropriately viewed from 
one perspective or the other depending on their level of PBGC insur- 
ance coverage. 
The rules of the game regarding PBGC insurance of corporate defined 
benefit plans may be changing, however. Both the rate structure and 
the  rules for voluntary termination of  underfunded plans  are being 
examined by Congress. The possibility of  a graduated premium rate 
schedule based on risk is being considered, as is the elimination of 
voluntary terminations of underfunded plans. 
The paper in this volume by Alan J. Marcus, “Corporate Pension 
Policy and the Value of PBGC Insurance,” develops an analytical model 
which can give quantitative consideration to these issues. As noted 
before, PBGC insurance can be viewed as a put option provided by 
the government to the firm’s shareholders.  Marcus applies modern 
options pricing methodology to derive the value of this put under two 
scenarios. The first allows for voluntary termination of an underfunded 
plan, which is still legal under current statutes. In practice, however, 
virtually all terminations of underfunded pension plans occur as a by- 
product of corporate bankruptcy, and there is good reason to believe 
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underfunded plans altogether. In the second scenario Marcus examines 
the effect of  such a prohibition. 
Under each scenario Marcus presents empirical estimates of the “fair 
market value” of the insurance provided by the PBGC for a sample of 
Fortune 100 firms. The results indicate that the magnitudes of the put 
values can differ substantially from the common measure, which  is 
accrued benefits less the sum of fund assets plus 30% of firm net worth. 
Taking these estimated values as the measure of the PBGC’s liability, 
a small number of firms appear to account for the bulk of these liabil- 
ities. Presumably, a risk-related premium structure based on the com- 
puted put values would result in  drastic differences from the current 
structure of a flat amount per covered employee regardless of the firm’s 
or its pension plan’s financial status. 
Prohibiting voluntary termination of underfunded plans drastically 
reduces the calculated value of the PBGC put. But, probably the main 
contribution of  Marcus’s paper  is that  it offers  a  starting point  for 
devising a fair, operational risk-related premium  structure for PBGC 
insurance. 
In the final paper in the area of pensions and corporate finance, “How 
Does the Market Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities?” Jeremy I. Bu- 
low, Randall MQrck, and Lawrence Summers confirm earlier analyses 
by Feldstein and others suggesting that the stock market valuation of 
firms reasonably accurately reflects their pension funding status. Their 
new contribution is in the methodology and broader data set they em- 
ploy. Instead of  using a straight cross-section test, they use a combi- 
nation of time series and cross section. 
1.3  Pensions and Retirement Income Adequacy 
The two papers  in  this  section deal with  the role  of  pensions  in 
providing an adequate and secure retirement income. 
In the first, “Concepts and Measures of Earnings Replacement dur- 
ing Retirement,”  Michael J. Boskin and John B.  Shoven present  an 
examination of some of the issues surrounding the measurement of the 
well-being of  the elderly relative to their previous standard of living, 
or so-called replacement rates. Among the issues they raise are the 
treatment of taxes, expenses of raising children, health and health care 
costs, income uncertainty,  and uncertainty  about the date of death. 
They actually adjust their data for three of these. 
Taxes are adjusted to reflect the special provisions of the tax code 
affecting the elderly. For example, until  1984 social security benefits 
have been completely tax free, and even now such benefits are tax 
preferred  relative to earnings in the working years. The elderly also 
have extra personal exemptions. Next a correction is made for family 7  Introduction 
size. During the working life, typically there are children to care for, 
while in retirement there are only one or two individuals who do not 
need as much money as they did before.  The third adjustment deals 
with uncertainty of  income, and the argument is as follows. When a 
person is young there is substantial uncertainty surrounding the value 
of his future earnings, whereas by the time of retirement, social security 
benefits in particular are relatively certain. Boskin and Shoven, there- 
fore, adjust the value of  social security benefits to reflect their lower 
risk. 
The paper then computes two measures of replacement adjusted in 
these three ways. The first is social security benefits relative to pre- 
retirement earnings and the second includes other sources of income 
including private pensions in the numerator. 
The results in general indicate that fully adjusted replacement rates 
are very  high for most people.  They  suggest that, for many  of  the 
elderly, earnings are virtually fully replaced by social security alone; 
for many more, social security replaces a large fraction of  earnings; 
and  total  post-retirement  income  usually  exceeds  pre-retirement 
earnings. 
In their paper, “Pension Plan Integration as Insurance against Social 
Security Risk,”  Robert C. Merton,  Zvi Bodie,  and  Alan J.  Marcus 
focus on a hitherto unexplored  aspect of the integration  of  pension 
plans  with  social  security. The manifest  purposes of  integrating an 
employer-provided pension plan with social security are (1) to insure 
adequate retirement income for all covered employees, and (2) to insure 
equity in retirement income defined as total replacement rates that are 
equal for all employees regardless of  salary level.  The focus of  the 
authors’ paper is on an equally important consequence of integration: 
the alteration of the risk-bearing relationships between employees, em- 
ployers, and the government vis-a-vis social security benefits. The main 
alteration is that the employer, in effect, insures his covered employees 
against adverse changes in their social security (retirement) benefits. 
Using the  option-pricing  methodology  of  modern  contingent claims 
analysis, the authors develop a formal model to explore the quantitative 
aspects of this change. 
While the focus of  the analysis is on full integration, the authors 
explicitly deal with various degrees of partial integration as is currently 
practiced. The authors analyze the effects of a switch from a nonin- 
tegrated to an equivalent-cost integrated plan when private benefits are 
fixed in nominal terms and when they are indexed. They also consider 
the effects of ad hoc post-retirement benefit increases and the incentive 
effects on worker mobility of the adoption of integrated plans. 
The most important finding is that for a common type of  integrated 
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earnings  spectrum in  effect  are selling part  of  their rights to social 
security to the plan sponsor. They are, therefore, trading a claim against 
the social security system for a claim against the firm. At the low end 
of  the earnings spectrum employees are maintaining much more of 
their claim to social security and obtaining insurance from the firm only 
against drastic reductions in the starting level of benefits. 
1.4  Pensions and Savings Behavior 
How do pensions, including social security, affect saving? This is a 
question which has received much attention from economists in the 
last few years, probably  because pensions and social security have 
become such large economic institutions at the same time that the U.S. 
saving rate was perceived to be grossly inadequate.  In the literature 
on the effect of  social security on saving, Martin S. Feldstein’s paper 
(1974) is seminal. In that study, Feldstein investigated how social se- 
curity affects aggregate consumption, saving, and the nation’s capital 
stock. His analysis emphasized the unfunded (pay-as-you-go) nature 
of the system. That is, he recognized that there is no social wealth or 
capital stock  corresponding to the apparent wealth  that  individuals 
accumulate (the right to a future stream of retirement income). In his 
analysis, Feldstein found that the private rate of saving would be dou- 
bled if  social security did not exist. The “false”  wealth substituted for 
real capital accumulation dollar for dollar. 
Two papers in this volume address a related issue and another reason 
why social security may reduce private saving. “Uncertain Lifetimes, 
Pensions, and Individual Saving,” by R. Glenn Hubbard, and “Annuity 
Markets, Savings, and the Capital Stock,” by Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 
John B. Shoven, and Avia Spivak, examine the effect of annuity mar- 
kets (that is, the availability of longevity insurance) on saving. Both 
papers examine the consumption and saving behavior of risk-averse 
individuals facing uncertainty about the length of their life. In the ab- 
sence of  longevity insurance, people save in a precautionary way to 
provide for the possibility of living a long life. This is accomplished by 
reduced consumption and, on average, results in  sizable unintended 
bequests.  If  annuity markets are perfected (and, importantly, social 
security benefits are paid out in an inflation-adjusted annuity form), 
both  saving and bequests  are reduced. The Kotlikoff,  Shoven, and 
Spivak paper estimates that the introduction of a fully funded actuar- 
ially fair retirement annuity program would reduce the steady-state rate 
of saving and capital stock from 35%  to 60%. Clearly, both papers are 
stylized simulations, but they do indicate that the annuity form of the 
payout of social security (given the substantial inperfections of private 9  Introduction 
annuity markets) may depress saving as much as its unfunded pay-as- 
you-go nature. 
The Kotlikoff,  Shoven, and Spivak paper and the Hubbard paper 
differ in their modeling of the counterfactual non-social  security state 
of the world. Hubbard has each family facing its longevity uncertainty 
alone with the resultant  unintended bequests  given to the children. 
Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak, on the other hand, argue that substantial 
insurance-type risk pooling can be achieved within the family itself, 
and therefore model the non-social  security state as one wherein family 
members pool longevity risks. In general, the existence of this inter- 
family contract would reduce the effect of the governmet or the private 
sector introducing  actuarially  fair annuity measures.  The Kotlikoff, 
Shoven, and Spivak paper also examines the equilibrium distribution 
of wealth in their model, where everyone has the same earnings profile. 
A nondegenerate but discontinuous wealth distribution results from the 
model with an individual’s wealth depending on the sequence of life 
spans of his ancestors. 
The paper “Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle 
Hypothesis,” by B. Douglas Bernheim, involves a more empircal ex- 
amination of saving and dissaving after retirement. The first question 
investigated is simply whether the elderly dissave or save during re- 
tirement. Bernheim provides new answers to this question looking at 
both bequeathable wealth and total wealth (that is, including the value 
of retirement annuities). The data set is the Retirement History Survey, 
so he is able to follow households longitudinally. 
The advantage of this approach is that it does not require the strong 
assumption necessary to address the question with cross-sectional data. 
He finds some dissaving during retirement, particularly among single 
individuals and early retirees. 
Bernheim investigates whether the observed patterns of saving and 
dissaving are consistent with the testable hypothesis following from 
the pure life cycle theory. He discovers that the empirical findings, in 
general, reject the implications of that model. 
1.5  Pensions and the Labor Market 
The two papers in this section employ data on characteristics  of 
actual defined benefit plans to infer the incentive effects of these plans 
on labor market behavior and the implications of the plans for different 
demographic groups. 
In their paper,  “The  Incentive Effects of  Private Pension Plans,” 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise find that there is a strikingly 
wide variation in the incentive effects of  pension plans. Typical plan 10  Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise 
designs provide a strong incentive for retirement at the plan’s normal 
retirement age, and  several plan types provide a strong incentive to 
retire at the age of early retirement. 
For example, many plans have both early and normal retirement at 
age 55. For these plans, the average decline  in  the rate of  pension 
accrual at age 55 is equivalent to about 30% of salary. If a person under 
these plans continued  to work  to age 65, pension  accrual would be 
negative and equivalent to approximately 30% of earnings. Thus, be- 
tween the ages of 54 and 65, the fall in the rate of pension accrual is 
approximately equivalent to a 60% salary reduction. The more common 
plans, with early retirement at age 55 and normal retirement at age 65, 
call, on average, for increasing rates of pension benefit accrual up to 
age 55 with a decline thereafter. However, the decline in accrual rates 
between the ages of 55 and 65 is not nearly as dramatic as the decline 
ascribed to plans that have both early and normal retirement at age 55. 
Under the more  common plans,  at age 65  pension  wealth  declines 
substantially. 
Only under plans with both early and normal retirement at age 65 
does pension wealth continue to increase until age 65. But even under 
plans with these provisions, the rate of pension accrual after age 65 
drops precipitously. In this case, the averge loss in pension wealth from 
working an additional year would be approximately equivalent to 40% 
of salary. In short, typical plans provide a strong incentive to work up 
to the age of early retirement, then an incentive to leave the labor force 
that gets stronger every year until the age of normal retirement, when 
the incentive increases dramatically. 
Even among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages, 
there is a wide range in plan provisions. While the typical plan may 
provide positive pension accrual rates at some age-say  62-the  accrual 
rate may be substantially negative for some plans. But even a small 
proportion of plans that provide a strong incentive to retire at a given 
age could have a substantial effect on aggregate labor force participation 
rates. 
For some employees, vesting could be a very important determinant 
of labor force participation. The accrual rate at the age of vesting can 
range from as low as 2% of wage earnings to as high as loo%, depending 
on the plan type and the age of initial employment. Given normal and 
early retirement ages, there is little difference in plan accrual profiles 
by industry or by occupation. Differences in pension benefits by in- 
dustry depend more on the type of plan than on variations among plans 
with the same basic provision. Because women typically live longer 
than men, accrued pension benefits at any age are higher for women 
than for men, about 13% on average at age 65, for example. The authors 
conclude that the rapid increase in pension plan coverage over the past 11  Introduction 
two or three decades may well have contributed substantially to the 
reduction in labor force participation of older workers during this pe- 
riod. The plans may also have an important effect on labor mobility. 
In their paper, “Pension Inequality,” Edward P.  Lazear and Sherwin 
Rosen focus on how the size of a pension tends to vary with the sex 
and race  of  the  individual,  conditional on the individual’s having a 
pension. Using data from the May  1979 Current Population  Survey, 
they first try to determine the average tenure, age, and salary of the 
typical retiree by sex and race. They then use the 1980 Bankers Trust 
Corporate Pension Plan Study to derive data on pension  plan char- 
acteristics. Their computations suggest that pension plans may exac- 
erbate black-white compensation inequality while reducing male-female 
compensation inequality. Even though females are less likely than males 
to work in jobs entitling them to pensions, females who are eligible for 
pensions do receive relatively generous ones. The average pension that 
the typical  retiring female receives is well below that of the typical 
male retiree, but the difference is not as pronounced as male-female 
differences in salary. 
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